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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA OAKLAND DIVISION

United States	of America,)	Case No. 4-13-70004	MAG	
	Plaintiff,)))	STIPULATED ORDER EXCL TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY	UDING TRIAL ACT	
v. JAMONN	BUNCOE, Defendant.)))	MAR 2020 RICHARD W. WIE CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OAKLAND	KING COURT	
For the reason stated by the parties on the record on MRL. 20, 2013, the Court excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from MRL. 20, 2013, to ARL. 1B, 2013 and finds that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The Court makes this finding and bases this continuance on the following factors:					
	Failure to grant a continuance would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(I). The case is so unusual or so complex, due to [circle applicable reasons] the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or the trial itself within the time limits established by this section. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii). Failure to grant a continuance would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, given counsel's other scheduled case commitments, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).				
					
	Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).				
For the reasons stated on the record, it is further ordered that time is excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) and waived with the consent of the defendant under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5.1(c) and (d).					
IT IS SO OR DATED:	DERED. , 2013		Hon. Randis A. Westm United States Magistrat		

GIL EISENBERGY Attorney for Defendant

STIPULATED

BEIGID MAKTIN

Assistant United States Attorney